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The Asian crisis took place against a background of exchange rate regimes that were 
characterized as soft pegs. This has led many analysts to conclude that “the peg did it” and that 
emerging markets (EMs) should “just say no” to pegged exchange rates. We present evidence 
that EMs are very different from developed economies in key dimensions that play a key role 
when it comes to the choice of exchange rate regime--floating for EMs is no panacea.  In EMs 
currency crashes are contractionary, the adjustments in the current account are far more acute. 
 Credibility and market access, as captured in the behavior of credit ratings and interest rates, is 
adversely affected by devaluations or depreciations.   Exchange rate volatility is more damaging 
to trade and the passthrough from exchange rate swings to inflation is far higher in EMs.  These 
differences between emerging and developed economies may explain EMs reluctance to tolerate 
large exchange rate movements.  In a simple framework we illustrate why large exchange rate 
swings are feared when access to international credit may be lost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
* This paper was prepared for the Brookings Trade Forum 2000, Policy Challenges in the Next 
Millenium, April 27-28, 2000, Washington, DC.  The authors wish to thank Susan Collins, 
Ricardo Hausmann, Michael Kumhoff, Vincent Reinhart, Dani Rodrik and Forum participants 
for helpful comments and suggestions and Ioannis Tokatlidis for superb research assistance. 
 
 2 
I. Introduction 
Nearly all the currency crises in the past decade took place against a background of 
exchange rate regimes that have been characterized--after the fact--as soft pegs. i  This has led 
many analysts to conclude that “the peg did it” and that emerging markets (EMs) should “just 
say no” to fixed exchange rates.  This advice seems paradoxical in light of the fact that most 
EMs have precarious access to international capital markets in the best of times and no access in 
the worst of times and that market access is often contingent on the stability of their currencies.  
This paper argues that, in fact, “floating” exchange rates are far from a panacea for EMs 
and that this policy advice misses a number of important real world considerations that are 
crucial for developing countries.  We present evidence that EMs are, indeed, very different from 
developed economies in several key dimensions that are bound to play an important role when it 
comes to the choice of exchange rate regime.  In EMs devaluations, or large depreciations for 
that matter, are contractionary, the adjustments in the current account are far more acute and 
abrupt.  Currency crises become credit crises as sovereign credit ratings often collapse following 
the currency collapse and access to international credit is lost.  Lack of credibility also gives rise 
to a chronic and marked volatility in domestic interest rates.  Furthermore, exchange rate 
volatility appears to by more damaging to trade and the passthrough from exchange rate swings 
to inflation is far higher in EMs than in developed economies.  These differences between 
emerging and developed economies are significant and may help explain EMs historic and 
present reluctance to tolerate large fluctuations in their exchange rates.” ii  In the context of a 
simple framework we show why devaluations may be contractionary when there is no access to 
international credit and lead to “fear of floating” and procyclical policies. iii 
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Section II presents some evidence on the “fear of floating” syndrome.  In Section III, we 
review the empirical evidence of selected key indicators following currency crashes for 
emerging and developed economies, take stock of the empirical evidence on the effects of 
exchange rate volatility on trade for EMs, and present some evidence on the extent of 
passthrough from exchange rates to prices.  In Section IV, we present an analytical framework 
that examines the case where the credibility loss translates into an inability to borrow from 
abroad and a devaluation can lead to a contraction in output.  Other reasons for fearing large 
exchange rate movements, including the role played by liability dollarization and an ineffective 
lender of last resort, are also discussed.  The last section discusses the implications of this 
analysis for the choice of exchange rate arrangements in EMs. 
 
 Section II.  Fear of Floating: Some Evidence 
In this section, we present evidence that, despite the relatively recent increase in the 
ranks of countries that are classified as “floaters” or “managed floaters,” nominal exchange rates, 
in fact, show little variation in most EMs.  We recap a few of the results presented in our earlier 
work, in which we analyze the monthly behavior of exchange rates, international reserves, base 
money, and interest rates for a broad array of countries during 1970-1999. iv  
In what follows, however, we limit our attention to the time series properties of monthly 
percent changes in the exchange rate. v, vi  Despite occasional bouts of foreign exchange market 
intervention, sometimes even in co-ordinated fashion, the United States dollar (US $) floated 
about as freely against the German Deutschemark (DM) and now the euro and the Japanese Yen 
(¥) as any currency is allowed to float.  For this reason, we compare countries that have regimes 
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that are classified as freely-floating or managed-floating against this “G-3" benchmark. 
We can glean what actual policy practices are by analyzing the frequency distributions of 
exchange rates around chosen intervals and comparing these across countries and regimes.   
According to the IMF’s classification scheme, countries are grouped into four types of exchange 
rate arrangements: peg, limited flexibility, managed floating, and, freely-floating.  Limited 
flexibility has, almost exclusively, been used to classify European countries (prior to the 
monetary union) with exchange rate arrangements vìs-a-vìs one another (i.e., the Snake, the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, etc.).  Hence, it is possible to evaluate the probability of a particular 
change or changes in the exchange rate, reserves, etc. conditional on the announced exchange 
rate regime. 
We denote the absolute value of the percent change in the exchange rate by ε.  Letting xc 
represent some critical threshold, we can estimate the probability that ε  falls within the pre-
specified bounds, conditional on a particular exchange rate arrangement. 
For example, if xc = ⏐1 %⏐, (i.e., ε lies within a plus/minus one percent band), then, 
P(ε  < xc  ⏐ Peg) > P(ε < xc  ⏐ Float).  That is, the probability that the monthly exchange rate 
change falls within the one percent band is greatest for the fixed-exchange regime and lowest for 
the freely floating arrangement, with the other two types of arrangements falling somewhere in 
between. 
Unless otherwise noted, the bilateral rates reported are with respect to the DM for the 
European countries and with respect to the United States dollar for everyone else.  The choice of 
the DM was owing to the fact that this was the most prominent reserve currency in Europe and, 
as Germany was the low inflation country for many years, currencies in Europe were largely tied 
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to the DM.  For the remaining countries the dollar is the usual anchor currency of choice, as the 
largest share of EM’s external debt is denominated in US dollars and world trade is 
predominantly dollar invoiced.   
Table 1 presents evidence of the frequency distribution of monthly exchange rate changes 
(in percent) for recent or current episodes that are classified as freely floating regimes.  Our 
chosen threshold values are,  xc = ⏐1 %⏐, and xc = ⏐2.5 %⏐, which is a comparatively narrow 
band.vii  For the United States, for example, less there is about a 59 percent probability that the 
monthly US $/DM exchange rate change falls within a relatively narrow plus/minus two-and-a-
half percent band.  For the $/¥ exchange rate, that probability is slightly higher at 61 percent. By 
contrast, for Bolivia, Canada, and India (all declared floaters during that period), that probability 
is in the ninety-four-to-ninety-six percent range.5  An alternative way of stating the same facts is 
that there is only about a 5 percent probability in those countries that an exchange rate change 
will exceed 2-½ percent on any given month (versus more than 40 percent for the US $/DM).  
On average, for the current set of floaters, the probability that the exchange rate change will be 
contained in this moderate plus/minus two-and-a-half-percent band will be over 79 percent--
significantly above that for the U.S. and Japan. viii   However, by this metric, post-crisis Mexico 
approximates a float more closely than any of the others--including Canada. ix 
Moderate-to-large monthly fluctuations in the exchange rate are even rarer among the so-
called “managed float” episodes (Table 2).  For Egypt and Bolivia, the probability of a monthly 
exchange rate change greater than two-and-a-half percent is nil--this was also the case for 
Indonesia and Korea up to the 1997 crisis.  Even for self-proclaimed flexible-rate advocates, 
such as Chile and Singapore, the frequency distribution of their monthly exchange rate 
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fluctuations relative to the U.S. dollar do not vaguely resemble that of the US $/DM or US $/¥, 
with a significantly higher proportion of observations falling within a narrow band; in the case of 
Singapore, there is an eighty-nine percent probability that monthly exchange rate changes are 
within a two-and-a-half-percent band, while for Chile that probability is only moderately lower. 
On average, there is an eighty-eight percent probability that managed floaters’ monthly changes 
in the exchange rate are confined to this narrow band. This exchange rate stability versus the US 
dollar (or DM if it is a European country) is surprising in light of the fact that for many of the 
emerging market countries during these episodes, inflation rates have been well above those 
observed for the United States and terms-of-trade shocks are frequent and large.  
Not surprisingly, Table 3 shows that for limited flexibility arrangements, the probabilities 
that exchange rate changes are confined to this band are even greater, at ninety-two and ninety-
five percent respectively.  Hence, the observed behavior according to the exchange rate regime 
accords with the priors stated in equation (1). What is most surprising is the narrowness of 
wedge across regimes.  While the mean probability that the exchange rate is contained inside a 
two-and-a-half percent band differs significantly when comparing the fixed exchange rate regime 
with the “freely” floating, other differences across regimes are blurred.  For example, the 
average probability that ε < ⏐2.5 %⏐ for “freely” floating regimes is not significantly different 
from that for managed floating, which, in turn, is not significantly different from the “limited 
flexibility” arrangement.  There is also no statistically significant difference between the limited 
flexibility category and the pegged exchange rate. x 
Furthermore, the results presented in our earlier work show that for most countries, 
interest rate and reserve variability are significantly higher than for the G-3, attesting to active 
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policies to smooth exchange rate fluctuations either by direct intervention in the foreign 
exchange market or by open market operations. xi  Our results suggest that, even in many of the 
countries that are classified as having a high degree of exchange rate flexibility, there is 
widespread fear of floating. 
 
 III. Emerging Markets Are Different: Some Stylized Facts 
In this section we document some of the key differences between EMs and developed 
economies that may help explain why EMs are often reluctant to allow their currencies to float 
freely and why policymakers in these countries may be particularly concerned about the 
consequences of large exchange rate swings. We discuss EMs problems with the loss of access 
to international capital markets, the contractionary effects of devaluations or depreciations, and 
the effects of chronic credibility problems.  The evidence on the adverse impact of exchange rate 
uncertainty on trade and the problems EMs may face owing to a higher inflation passthrough are 
also examined in an effort to understand why exchange rate variability is so widely resisted. 
 
1. The Sudden Stop Problem  
In this subsection, we begin by briefly sketching what is meant by the sudden stop, SS, 
problem, or the immediate drying up of access to world financial markets; we then go on to 
assess its empirical content. We analyze different aspects of the aftermath of currency crises for 
developed and emerging markets separately, including what happens to growth, the current 
account, and to sovereign credit ratings. xii  Our sample includes twenty-five countries, which are 
listed in Appendix Table 1; the data span the period 1970 through 1999, which includes 96 
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currency crisis episodes. xiii  Twenty-five of these crises are in developed economies, while the 
remainder are in EMs. 
By national income accounting and abstracting from errors and omissions, net capital 
inflows equal the current account deficit plus accumulation of international reserves.  Therefore, 
a sudden stop to capital inflows, has to be met by reserve losses or by a reduction in the current 
account deficit.  In practice, both take place.  While a loss of international reserves increases the 
country’s financial vulnerability, a forced contraction in the current account deficit usually has 
serious effects on production and employment. 
To see this, note that the current account deficit equals aggregate demand minus GNP.  
Thus, a sudden contraction in the current account deficit necessitates either a sharp decline in 
aggregate demand or, in the unlikely case, an offsetting increase in GNP.  The decline in 
aggregate demand, in turn, falls on both the demand for tradables and nontradables.  The excess 
supply of tradables thus created can be shipped abroad, but the nontradables are, by definition, 
bottled up at home.  Thus, the relative price of home to traded goods will have to fall (resulting 
in a real depreciation of the currency).  A prominent example of the process is the real estate 
sector, where relative prices have exhibited sharp declines in all the recent crises. 
From here, what is the process producing a loss of output and employment?  Two 
channels can be identified, depending on the nature of the contract that is inadequate to react to a 
deflationary impulse: (1) Keynesian, and (2) Fisherian.  The Keynesian channel is 
straightforward, familiar, and is predicated on the assumption that prices and wages are 
inflexible downward.  Under these conditions, a fall in aggregate demand brings about a fall in 
output and employment. 
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In contrast, the Fisherian channel is less familiar but, in our view, potentially more 
damaging.  Financial contracts are, as a general rule, contingent on very few “states of nature,” 
i.e., objective variables, like terms of trade, profit, demand, etc.  A bank loan, for example, is 
typically serviced by a series of fixed installments unless the borrower goes bankrupt.  To a first 
approximation, and consistent with the Fisherian channel, loans are made at a fixed 
predetermined interest rate that takes into account expected future variables, but are not 
conditioned to their future realizations.  Consider a situation in which the exchange rate is fixed 
and the international price of tradables is exogenous and constant over time.  A decline in 
aggregate demand that accompanies SS calls for a lower relative price of nontradables with 
respect to tradables.  Because the price of tradables is stable, to achieve a lower relative price of 
nontradables with respect to tradables, the nominal price of nontradables must fall.  Thus, since 
the interest rate is invariant with respect to SS, there is a surge in the ex post real interest rate 
faced by nontradables’ producers, increasing the share of nonperforming loans.  In the remainder 
of this subsection, we document the incidence and magnitude of the SS problem for emerging 
and developed economies. 
Table 4 reports averages across the 96 currency crises in our sample of the current 
account deficit as a percent of gross national product (GDP) and the growth in GDP around the 
year of the crisis year (T). xiv The fourth column reports the change, or adjustment, that took 
place between the year immediately preceding the crisis (T-1) and the year after the crisis (T+1). 
 The crises episodes were aggregated by classifying the countries as either developed or 
emerging.  The differences between the two groups are also reported with an indication as to 
whether these are statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
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The general pattern in the current account deficit and economic growth are quite similar 
for EMs and developed economies; in both groups of countries, the currency crisis produces both 
a reduction in the current account deficit and in growth. xv  Hence, at least in this sample, 
devaluations in neither group that accompany crises are expansionary, as suggested by most 
standard textbook models. xvi  However, there are also important differences between EMs and 
developed countries.   The sudden stop problem in EMs, as measured by the current account 
adjustment between T-1 and T+1, is almost five times as large (about 3.5 percent versus 0.7 
percent) as that for developed economies.  Furthermore, the difference between the two groups 
of countries is significant at standard confidence levels.  As we will show later in this section, 
that larger adjustment in the current account may be the outcome of EMs involuntary loss of 
access to international capital markets in the wake of currency crises. xvii  Indeed, in Section III, 
we will present a simple analytical framework that suggests that lack of credibility is likely to be 
at the heart of this key difference between emerging and developed markets and that this 
credibility problem may be so severe at times of stress that it results in an abrupt collapse in the 
country’s ability to borrow in international capital markets. 
In that light, as shown in Table 4, it is not surprising that the magnitude of the recession 
following the currency crash is also significantly greater for EMs.  While the growth slowdown 
for developed economies is less than 0.2 percent (which is not statistically significant from zero), 
the recession in EMs is far more marked, with a reduction in growth of about 2 percent. xviii This 
difference in growth performance between the developed and emerging markets is also 
statistically significant; indeed the last column, which shows the change relative to the pre-crisis 
performance highlights more clearly the gap between EMs and developed economies. 
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Furthermore, as shown in our earlier work, the severity of the recessions appears to be worsening 
in the 1990s. xix   Indeed, in the subset of crises in the 1990s there is an actual contraction in 
output--not just a sharp slowdown in growth. 
One, possibly crucial, reason for the deeper recessions and larger current account 
adjustments in EMs following currency crises is that these countries do not enjoy the 
international standing of their developed counterparts and, hence, EMs may face substantial 
difficulties in obtaining external financing during the period following a 
devaluation/depreciation. One indication of how international capital markets view these 
countries can be gleaned by examining the evolution of credit ratings around these episodes.  In 
the next subsection, we formally explore this issue by studying the incidence and magnitudes of 
sovereign credit rating downgrades during these currency crises episodes. 
 
2.  Loss of Access to International Capital Markets: An Emerging Market Problem 
In what follows, we examine the behavior around financial crises of sovereign credit 
ratings issued by Moody’s Investor Service and Institutional Investor (II). The II sample begins 
in 1979 and runs through 1999.  For the Moody’s ratings, we have an unbalanced panel. xx  The 
subset of the currency crises examined, as before, are those listed in Appendix Table 1.  For II, 
the ratings are an index that runs from zero (least creditworthy) to 100 (most creditworthy). The 
II rankings are reported twice a year and are changed frequently.  For Moody’s, which uses 
multiple letters to characterize a sovereign’s creditworthyness, we map their letter ratings into 
sixteen possible categories, with sixteen corresponding to the highest rating and zero to the 
lowest.  xxi  This scale is reproduced in Table 5.  The ratings may be changed at any time, hence 
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we have the month during which any changes took place.  Unlike the II rankings, rating changes 
are far more rare. 
Tables 6 and 7 present several results from the analysis of the II and Moody’s sovereign 
ratings, respectively.  We report a variety of statistics that are meant to capture the various 
manifestations of the extent and the terms of access to international lending around currency 
crises episodes.  The statistics reported include: the probability of a downgrade for various time 
horizons following the currency crisis, the probability of multiple downgrades, and the level of 
the assigned rating at the time of the crisis, and six and twelve months following that event.  We 
also report the percent change in the ratings at several time horizons.  As before, we report the 
results for emerging and developed countries separately and test for differences among the two 
groups.  Significant differences are denoted by one or more asterisks, depending on the 
significance level. 
Turning to the II results first, as shown in the top panel of Table 6, we find no significant 
differences between developed countries and EMs in the probability of a downgrade (or multiple 
downgrades) following the currency crisis.  However, this is where the similarities among the 
two country groups end. It is worth noting (see middle panel, Table 6) that at the time of the 
crisis, the average rating for the EMs is 37.6, slightly less than half of the average score for 
developed countries.  This, of course, suggests that even in the absence of a crisis, access to 
international lending is far from even for the two country groupings.  Furthermore, that vast gap 
widens further in the aftermath of the devaluations associated with the currency crises.  In the 
twelve months following the currency crisis, the magnitude of the downgrade is about five times 
greater  for EMs than it is for developed economies.  On average, EMs’s sovereign rating index 
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falls 10.8 percent in the twelve months following the currency crisis.  The differences between 
the post-crisis downgrade for emerging and developed economies is significant at standard 
confidence levels.  
The gulf between EMs and developed economies is even greater when a comparable 
exercise is performed for the Moody’s ratings.  As with II, the level of the ratings at the outset of 
the currency crisis is significantly lower for EMs--the sovereign rating level is about a third of 
that assigned to developed economies. Also, as the II results, the magnitude of the downgrade is 
far greater for EM--about 9 percent versus less than one percent for developed countries.  
However, as shown in Table 7, in the case of Moody’s sovereign ratings, both the probability of 
a downgrade in the twelve months following the crisis and the probability of multiple 
downgrades is significantly higher for the EMs in our sample. 
To complement the preceding analysis, we examine whether knowing that there was a 
currency crisis indeed helps to predict sovereign credit rating downgrades for emerging and 
developed economies.  For II, for which there is a continuous time series, we regress the six-
month change in the credit rating index on a currency crisis dummy variable, which takes on the 
value of one when there is a crisis and zero otherwise; the crisis dummy enters with a six month 
lag. xxii  The method of estimation is generalized least squares, correcting for both generalized 
forms of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals.  For Moody’s, the dependent 
variable is three-month changes in the rating, while the explanatory variable is the crisis dummy 
three months earlier.  The latter specification will allow us to glean more precisely whether 
downgrades follow rapidly after crises take place.  In the case of Moody’s, the sovereign rating 
dependent variable is allowed to assume the value of minus one, zero, or one, depending on 
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whether there was a downgrade, no change, or an upgrade.  We estimate the parameters of 
interest with an ordered probit technique that allows us to correct for heteroskedastic 
disturbances. 
The results of the estimation are summarized in Table 8 for both II and Moody’s ratings.  
In the case of EMs, currency crises help predict downgrades, irrespective which rating index is 
used.  For developed countries, however, there is no conclusive evidence that ratings react to 
currency crises in a systematic and significant way.  For EMs, however, the coefficients are 
significant at standard confidence levels--even though their marginal predictive contribution 
remains small.  For example, in the case of Moody’s, a currency crisis increases the likelihood of 
a downgrade by five percent.  This difference in the reaction of sovereign ratings between 
developed economies and EMs is not entirely surprising, in light of the preceding discussion 
about the more severe slowdowns that follow currency crises in EMs.  To the extent that the 
downturn in economic activity is perceived to increase the risk of difficulties in meeting debt 
obligations, credit ratings have tended to behave in a reactive manner. 
These results are also in line with the findings of other authors, who find evidence of 
two-way causality between sovereign ratings and market spreads. xxiii  Hence not only do 
international capital markets react to changes in the ratings, but the ratings systematically react 
(with a lag) to market conditions, as reflected in the sovereign bond yield spreads. 
 
3.  Exchange Rate Volatility and Trade: EMs are Different 
While the preceeding analysis has focused on the differences between EMs and 
developed countries in periods of market stress, in the next three subsections we turn our 
attention to differences that are always present--crisis or no crisis.  Given the outwardly-oriented 
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growth strategy pursued by many EMs and, more generally, the prominent role played by 
international trade, we revisit the literature that has examined the links between exchange rate 
uncertainty and trade.  The aim of this exercise is not to provide an exhaustive review of this vast 
literature; our focus is on what these studies reveal about the differences between EMs and 
developed economies. 
There are a large number of studies that have attempted to examine the link between 
exchange rate uncertainty and trade for industrial countries.  Some studies, such as Kenen and 
Rodrik (1986), found that real exchange rate volatility has adverse consequences for the imports 
of several developed economies.  Yet, other studies (see Mann, 1989, for example,) found little 
evidence of any systematic effects.  In general, the results from this literature are quite mixed, at 
least as far as industrial countries are concerned. xxiv  While the body of work that examines the 
link between exchange rate volatility and trade is thinner for EMs, most of the existing studies 
appear to find more consistent patterns in the data.  In general, this literature, which is largely 
summarized in Table 9, seems to point in the direction that exchange rate variability has 
deleterious effects on trade, through its impacts on either EM exports to the rest of the world or 
EM imports. As shown in Table 9, only one of the papers that focuses on EMs--Medhora (1990), 
which examines the imports of the West African Monetary Union--finds no link between 
exchange rate volatility and trade. Taken together, these findings would seem to support those of 
Rose (1999), who using data for 186 countries over the 1975-1990 period, finds that countries 
that share a common currency trade three times as much with each other as those who lack the 
common currency. 
The more conclusive evidence that trade is adversely affected by exchange rate volatility 
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in EMs is not entirely surprising and may owe to several features of the EMs themselves.  First, 
as McKinnon, for example has shown, the patterns of trade invoicing are markedly different in 
EMs and industrial countries. xxv  In explaining what he calls the East Asian dollar standard, he 
observes that nearly all trade with the United States--including East Asia’s trade--is dollar 
denominated.  About 98 percent of United States exports and nearly 90 percent of its imports are 
dollar invoiced.  Furthermore, he notes, 
On a worldwide basis, manufactured and brand name goods tend to be invoiced 
in the home currency of the exporting country primary commodities remain 
overwhelmingly dollar invoiced. xxvi 
The preceeding statement is particularly relevant for EMs, even those that have little 
trade with the United States, as many of these countries’ exports have a high primary commodity 
content.  Indeed, the evidence presented in some studies on a developed countries, reveals that 
invoicing patterns matter in determining the effects of exchange rate volatility on exports. xxvii  
While in earlier subsections we focussed on why EMs may fear depreciations or 
devaluations, as the case may be, and in this section we turned our attention to exchange rate 
volatility, EMs also tend to fear the consequences of large real appreciations.  Appreciations are 
resisted, not only for the obvious reason that it erodes international competitiveness, but also 
because of concerns about Dutch-disease-type problems.  Such concerns are especially 
commonplace when countries are attempting to diversify their export base.  xxviii 
A second feature of EMs that may explain why real exchange rate volatility has a 
negative effect on trade is the incomplete nature of its capital markets.  Exporters and importers 
in developed countries, where futures markets are relatively well developed, have the tools to 
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hedge exchange rate risk.  In EMs, futures markets are either illiquid or nonexistent. Hence the 
central bank’s behavior (the fear of large exchange rate swings) may reveal an effort by the 
authorities to replicate the conditions for exporters and importers that capital markets provide for 
in the developed world. 
 
4. Inflation and Exchange Rate Pass-through Issues 
Another reason why EMs may fear floating, in general, and devaluations or 
depreciations, in particular, may be traced to concerns about the effects of large currency swings 
on domestic inflation. This exchange rate passthrough issue merits considerable attention, 
especially in the context of countries that have adoted or are thinking of adopting inflation 
targets. xxix  In this subsection, we explore the empirical content of this issue with the aim of 
exploring whether emerging markets are also different in this regard. 
Estimates of exchange rate passthrough should be grounded on a well-defined, micro-
founded model.  However, in the absence of such a model (or models) for this hybrid group of 
countries we rely, as a first pass, on simple techniques that allow us to glean what the temporal 
relationship between exchange rate changes and inflation looks like. 
We estimate for each exchange rate regime, a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) 
model in inflation and exchange rate changes.  The regimes covered in this exercise total 41 in 
number and cover the cases shown in Tables 1-3. xxx  While the exercise is a simple one, it has 
several appealing features.  First, because our delineation of the sample for each case is dictated 
by the exchange rate arrangement, it is less likely to be subject to Lucas-critique type problems--
to the extent that passthrough may depend on the type of exchange rate arrangement.  Second, 
 
 18 
the VAR approach  treats both variables a potentially endogenous.  This is particularly 
importantwhere EMs are concerned, as Appendix Tables 3-5 attest.  There are several instances 
where the relationship runs from inflation to exchange rates, as countries follow a purchasing 
power of parity rule. xxxi  Third, it allows the data to reveal what the dynamic relationship 
between the two variables of interest are, as the lag length for the VAR is selected on a case by 
case basis according to the Swartz criteria.  This is particularly valuable when it comes to 
comparing high and low inflation countries, as in the case of the former the passthrough tends to 
be more immediate. 
Table 10, provides a summary of the incidence and magnitude of exchange rate 
passthrough. xxxii  Two features of the results stand out.  First, the percent of cases where the 
block-exogeneity tests indicate that the lagged exchange rate change has a statistically 
significant effect on inflation is 43 percent for EMs versus 13 percent for developed countries.  
Secondly, the average passthrough is about 4 times as large for EMs as for developed economies. 
 Taken together, these results may also help understand EMs intolerance to large exchange rate 
fluctuations--especially devaluations or depreciations. xxxiii 
 
 
5.  EMs: The Chronic Credibility Problem 
 
Earlier in this section we presented evidence that EMs access to capital markets is 
precarious even in the absence of a crisis.  This credibility problem is reflected sovereign credit 
ratings that are vastly inferior to those that prevail for developed countries--even prior to a 
devaluation.  This lack of credibility also permiates the magnitude and abruptness of the sudden 
stop problem discussed earlier.  In this subsection, we present yet another manifestation of the 
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chronic credibility problems faced by many EMs.   
Recalling that interest rates are an intertemporal price and, as such, heavily influenced by 
expectations, high and volatile interest rates are indicators of lack of credibility.  As shown in 
Table 11, interest rates are about five times more volatile in EMs as in developed economies; 
and that gap widens even further if we include countries with a history of chronic inflation. xxxiv  
This gap between the low and chronic inflation EMs is hardly surprising.  Many EMs have a 
weak revenue base and a rudimentary tax collection system, this combination has driven many a 
country,  particularly in Latin America, to use and abuse the inflation tax--Calvo dubs this 
problem the “Political Fiscal Gap.”  xxxv As firms and households take into account the 
possibility of being taxed in this manner, credibility problems will be exacerbated and translated 
into high and volatile interest rates.  As we will show in the next section, this interest rate 
volatility may be the outcome of procyclical policies that are responding to unstable 
expectations. 
Taken together, the evidence of the preceding subsections suggest that EMs may have 
solid grounds for resisting and fearing devaluations and exchange rate variability at large.  Not 
only are currency crises contractionary, but they are associated with large and significant 
changes in countries’ ability to borrow from international sources.  The marked and systematic 
declines in credit ratings for EMs following currency crashes, in contrast to the relatively 
unscathed developed economies, suggest that the large adjustments in the current account--the 
sudden stop problem--that we observe in the data may be largely owing to an abrupt and 
involuntary loss of access to international capital markets.   If such is the dire outcome of a 
currency crisis for EMs, one may expect to find a generalized tendency in their policies to limit 
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exchange rate fluctuations, at least when compared to the currency swings we observe in the 
developed economies that allow their exchange rate to float freely.  The next subsection presents 
selective evidence on this issue by comparing the extent of exchange rate variability that is to be 
found in the data, irrespective of the announced exchange rate arrangement. 
 
IV. Varieties of Fear of Floating 
In the previous section, we presented evidence that there is a widespread fear of large 
exchange rate swings, made understandable by the fact that devaluations (or depreciations) in 
EMs tend to be contractionary.  Furthermore, in the case of Ems. these appear to be accompanied 
by an erosion of credibility (as revealed by deteriorating credit ratings).  Indeed, the erosion in 
credibility may be so severe so as to result in a loss of access to international capital markets.  In 
this section, we present an analytical framework that examines the link between lack of 
credibility and fear of floating (or, more generally, allowing the exchange rate to adjust); we also 
consider the more extreme case where the credibility loss translates into an inability to borrow 
from abroad and a contraction in output.  Other reasons for fearing exchange rate swings, 
including the role played by liability dollarization and an ineffective lender of last resort, are also 
discussed. 
1.  Managing Monetary Policy 
Despite their heterogeneity, EMs tend to share a common characteristic--they appear to 
be reluctant to let their currencies fluctuate freely.  This leads us to conjecture that there may be 
at least one common cause--lack of credibility.   If credibility is not conferred–the monetary 
authority has no authority.  Expectations will rule the day.  These credibility problems may be 
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manifested in multiple ways, including volatile interest rates and sovereign credit ratings.  
Furthermore, lack of credibility may give rise to liability dollarization and limit the central 
bank’s ability to act as an effective lender of last resort, all of which feed this fear of exchange 
rate fluctuations.  
   We can use a simple version of a conventional monetary model to put more structure on 
the lack of credibility conjecture.  Let us assume that the demand for money satisfies the 
following Cagan form: xxxvi 
where m and e are the logs of the money supply and the nominal exchange rate, and Et is the 
mathematical expectations operator conditional on information available in period t (which 
includes money supply and exchange rate in period t.  The interest-semi-elasticity parameter is 
denoted by α.   
 For simplicity, consider the case in which money supply in periods 2 onwards takes a 
constant value m .  Then one can show that in a Rational Expectations equilibrium we have 
Thus, the exchange rate in period 1 (which we could identify with the present) is a weighted 
average of present and future money supply.  Moreover, and by the same token, et = m , for  t = 
2, 3,. . . .  On the other hand, assuming (again, for simplicity) perfect capital mobility and that 
the international interest rate equals zero, we have that the nominal interest rate it = et+1 - et 
m e E e et t t t t− = − >+α α( ),1 0
e
m m
1
1
1
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satisfies 
Case 1.  Permanent Increase in Present m.  Suppose that the economy was at steady state (i.e., 
money supply constant at m)  and it is shocked by an unanticipated once-and-for-all increase in 
the supply of money in period 1.  By (2) and (3), the exchange rate suffers a permanent 
devaluation accompanied by no interest rate volatility. 
Case 2.  Permanent Increase in Future m.  By (2) and (3), a permanent increase in future 
money supply m  (keeping m1 constant) results in an increase in both the current exchange rate 
and interest rate. 
Under circumstances of poor credibility, a policymaker faced with currency devaluation, 
who does not intend to increase future money supply, faces a serious dilemma: if money supply 
in period 1 is not adjusted upward, the ex post real interest rate will increase, possibly generating 
difficulties in the real and financial sectors.  On the other hand, if m1 is jacked up to stabilize 
interest rates, credibility could be impaired and future expectations could become more unruly 
and arbitrary. xxxvii 
To increase realism, let us assume that the central bank pays interest im on money, and 
that the demand for money satisfies: 
where “~” on variable m is a reminder that it refers to interest-earning money.   It can readily be 
i e e
m m
1 2 1
1
1
= − = −+ α .
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verified that equations (2) and (3) are still valid for the present version, if one defines 
Hence, under this interpretation, raising central-bank-controlled (CBC), interest rates would be 
equivalent to lowering money supply.  In this context, the currency devaluation that would be 
caused by a positive shock on future money supply, m , could be partially or fully offset by 
raising CBC interest rates (recall equation (2)), a typical policy followed in EMs when the 
exchange rate threatens to rise sharply.  Interestingly, by (3), the associated fall in m1 raises 
market interest rates even more than if the central banks had stayed put.  So this analysis 
suggests that in practice EMs have exhibited a pro-interest-rate-volatility bias. 
If policy makers were faced with the choice between stabilizing i or stabilizing e, then the 
decision would be clear: stabilize the exchange rate. Exchange rate stabilization provides the 
economy with a clear-cut nominal anchor, while stabilizing i does not.  In general, policymakers 
will find it optimal to allow for some volatility in both variables, but always steering clear from 
perfect interest rate stability.  Therefore, credibility problems may bias the outcome towards 
lower exchange rate and higher interest rate volatility, as borne by the facts.  
Before doing so, we next turn to the case in which lack of credibility is so intense, that 
the country loses access to capital markets. 
 
2. The Role of Loss of Access to International Capital Markets 
While the previous subsection discussed the conduct of monetary policy when credibility 
is absent, in this subsection, we focus on cases in which lack of credibility is so intense that the 
m m it t t
m= −~ .α
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country loses access to capital markets. This is a first-approximation to the serious capital-
market difficulties that EMs underwent during recent crises, especially during the Russian crisis 
of August 1998.  Indeed, the evidence of more frequent and significantly more severe 
downgrades in sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of devaluations for EMs presented in 
Section II suggests that this capital market problem is far more generalized than the examples 
provided by the recent crises in Asia and Russia. xxxviii  
Consider an economy with tradable and home goods, but without physical capital.  Let c 
and h denote the consumption of tradables and home goods, respectively.  The instantaneous 
utility index is given by u(c) + v(h), where u and v are increasing, strictly concave, and twice 
differentiable over the positive real line.  The intertemporal utility function is time-separable, 
and exhibits a positive rate of time preference r, which for convenience is set equal to the 
(constant) international interest rate.  The output of tradables is exogenously given.  In contrast, 
home-good prices are staggered, and the output of home goods is demand determined.  
Government lump-sum rebates all income to the representative individual.  Moreover, 
consumption is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint that takes the following form: 
where m denotes real monetary balances in terms of home goods, and e is the real exchange rate, 
i.e., the ratio of the nominal exchange rate to the price of home goods (the international price of 
tradables is set equal to unity). xxxix 
We will examine the impact of a once-and-for-all devaluation of the currency under two 
polar regimes: perfect capital mobility and no capital mobility.  Recent devaluations in advanced 
m e c ht t t t≥ + ,
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economies have not impaired the countries’ ability to borrow abroad.  Sweden, for example, has 
even been able to externally finance domestic bank rescue packages.  In contrast, devaluations in 
EMs have been accompanied by a serious interruption of external financing.  Therefore, the 
analysis of the two polar cases will hopefully help us to better understand why devaluations in 
EMs are linked to output loss, while the opposite happened in advanced economies. 
Let us assume that the economy starts at a steady state and has zero foreign assets or 
liabilities.  Let us denote the supply of tradables by y.  For simplicity, we assume y constant over 
time.  Thus, under the above assumptions, at the steady state we have c = y.  Moreover, given the 
separability of the instantaneous utility index, and the equality between the subjective rate of 
discount and the international rate of interest, a once-and-for-all devaluation does not affect 
tradables’ consumption.  Hence, c = y after devaluation.  Furthermore, the following static first-
order condition is satisfied (interior solutions are assumed throughout): 
which is the familiar equality between marginal rate of substitution and relative price.  Hence, 
before and after devaluation the following condition holds under perfect capital mobility: 
Therefore, since a devaluation entails an increase in e (recall that home-goods prices are sticky), 
on impact a devaluation is always expansionary (i.e., it leads to a rise in h and, hence, in the 
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output of home goods). xl 
Consider now the case of no capital mobility.  Under this condition, the stock of nominal 
money cannot be changed instantaneously.  Thus, since home-goods prices are sticky, m is a 
predetermined variable.  Moreover, with positive nominal interest rates (as in the present model), 
the cash-in-advance constraint is binding.  Hence, 
where the subindex “∞” denote steady state, and time t = 0 is, by definition, the point in time at 
which devaluation takes place.  Figure 1 illustrates the determination of c and h at time t = 0 
under the two regimes, where superscript KM and NKM refer to perfect capital mobility and no 
capital mobility, respectively.  Point A corresponds to the steady state prior to devaluation, 
where the slope of the line passing through A corresponds to the real exchange rate prior to 
devaluation.  After devaluation, relative prices are given by the slope of the dashed lines.  With 
capital mobility, on impact the economy shifts to a point like B and, as noted above, home-good 
output rises.  Thus, given that tradables’ consumption remains the same while its price goes up, 
and consumption of home goods rises, it follows from equation (1) that, on impact, real 
monetary balances have to increase and be larger than m0.  However, by condition (4), under no 
capital mobility, expenditure cannot exceed m0.  Hence, the no-capital-mobility equilibrium, 
point C, is reached from point B as if the consumer in the standard textbook analysis had 
suffered a negative income effect.  Consequently, if goods are normal (which holds under the 
present static separability assumption), consumption (and hence production) of home goods is 
larger with than without capital mobility.  Therefore, devaluation is more expansionary with 
m e y h e c h0 0 0 0= + = +∞ ∞ ,
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than without capital mobility.  This is the central proposition.  As a subsidiary result, note that if 
the income effect dominates the substitution effect, devaluation with no capital mobility would be 
contractionary (although, of course, it is always expansionary under perfect capital mobility).  
This income-effect dominance condition is empirically plausible given that home goods are 
largely comprised of services, which are likely to be highly complementary with tradables. 
Consequently, the analysis shows that losing access to capital markets when a country 
devalues tends to suppress the expansionary effects of devaluation.  Moreover, if market access 
is not lost, devaluation is always expansionary.  This analysis suggests the following explanation 
for why output in advanced economies and EMs reacted so differently to speculative attack on 
their currencies.  Devaluation in advanced countries came as a result of an attack on their 
currencies, but there is no evidence that their creditworthiness was put into question.  In contrast, 
in all recent EMs crises, the attack was, first and foremost, on bonds issued by the country in 
question, making debt rollover impossible or very difficult.  Thus, the key to the explanation 
may lie in loss of capital-market access. 
In terms of our central discussion in this section, the model gives a rationale for countries 
that have poor access to the capital market to be reluctant to devalue in order to relieve balance-
of-payments difficulties. xli  Moreover, Mexico’s Tequila crisis suggests that a devaluation may 
trigger a loss of access to capital markets, especially if it is seen as breaking a policy 
commitment. xlii  This is an additional reason for EMs to exhibit devaluation-aversion and, thus, 
generate a smoother exchange rate path. 
Consequently, the analysis shows that losing access to capital markets when a country 
devalues tends to suppress the expansionary effects of devaluation.  Moreover, if market access 
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is not lost, devaluation is always expansionary.  This is at the root of why output in advanced 
economies and EMs reacted so differently to speculative attack on their currencies.  Devaluation 
in advanced countries came as a result of an attack on their currencies that did not put their 
creditworthiness into question.  In contrast, in all recent EMs crises, there was an attack, first and 
foremost, on bonds issued by the country in question, making debt rollover impossible or very 
difficult.  Thus, the key to the explanation may lie in loss of capital-market access. 
 
3.  Ineffective Lender of Last Resort.   
A very popular view is that adoption of a Currency Board or Dollarization significantly 
detracts from the central bank’s ability to operate as a Lender of Last Resort, LOLR.  This view 
is based on the conjecture that, since sums involved in bank bailouts are usually huge, an 
effective LOLR should be able to issue its own money.   
Typically, bank regulation allows banks to hold fractional reserves against deposits and 
imposes non-prohibitive costs on a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities.  As a result, 
banks’ liabilities are more liquid than bank assets, which makes them liable to successful bank 
runs.  A possible way to prevent self-fulfilling bank-run prophecies is for the central bank to step 
in and bail out the banking system if a run takes place.  If expected by the public, the bailout may 
never have to be activated, thus making LOLR capabilities costless to the central bank and 
beneficial to the private sector. 
Diamond and Dybvig, DD, formalized self-fulfilling bank runs in terms of a non-
monetary model. xliii This highly quoted paper gives welfare grounds for the liquidity mismatch, 
and shows that, as a result, banks would be liable to self-fulfilling runs.  However, if the 
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government announces that it will step in so that every depositor will come out whole, no bank 
run ever takes place.  This operation captures the notion behind the existence of a LOLR.  To 
make it credible, however, the government has to be able to raise enough taxes to finance the 
operation.  Given the sums involved, this normally requires issuing government debt, which will 
eventually be serviced by higher taxes.  However, this may not be possible for a country that has 
lost access to the capital market. xliv 
Another drawback of DD is that it is a real model and, hence, cannot directly address the 
issue of whether relinquishing the issuance of one’s own money could seriously impair the 
effectiveness of the LOLR.  Suppose that deposits are denominated in domestic money, and that 
the central bank guarantees that depositors will be able to withdraw 100 percent of their deposits, 
if they so wish.  A mechanic application of DD might suggest that this would be effective in 
preventing self-fulfilling bank runs.  But this is wrong.  In a monetary economy, the above 
guarantee does not ensure depositors that their deposits’ purchasing power will remain intact. 
Consider first the simple case in which bank-deposit interest rates are subject to a 
statutory ceiling (e.g., regulation Q).  Then, if depositors expect a BOP crisis, there will be a 
bank run which the government cannot stop by the mere artifact of issuing money.  Indeed, the 
act of issuing money will actually worsen the BOP crisis.  This example is not very relevant in 
modern economies, because a large share of deposits earns interest (this will also be the 
equilibrium outcome of DD in a monetary economy).  Under those circumstances, though, bank 
runs could cause BOP crises.  First note that depositors are unlikely to switch their deposits 
entirely into non-interest-bearing domestic cash.  Instead, they are likely to try to hold alternative 
interest-earning assets (e.g., land) or foreign exchange.  As a result, if the central bank is unable 
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to sterilize the extra bailout liquidity, the price level and/or exchange rate are bound to take a 
sharp upturn, unless the central bank has enough reserves to back up a large aggregate like M2. 
xlv Consequently, if depositors expect a bank run, either depositors will withdraw their deposits–
validating the run–or interest rates on bank deposits will have to become sharply higher. 
If higher interest rates are successful in stopping bank runs, a LOLR would not be 
needed, because this operation could be undertaken by the banks without the help of the central 
bank.  However, we cannot be very hopeful about the high-interest strategy because to 
compensate for a sharp price rise, interest rates may have to be so large that if the run is stopped, 
banks will go bankrupt (for fundamental reasons now).  Banks would go under water either 
because interest rates on their liabilities rise substantially more than on their assets or, if that 
kind of interest-rate mismatch is avoided, because their loans become nonperforming. 
To keep depositors from fleeing the banking system, deposits could be indexed to prices 
(e.g., UDIs in Chile) or exchange rates.  The latter, i.e., “dollarization” of deposits, is a very 
popular practice in EMs.  Indexation provides an automatic mechanism to implicitly raise 
deposit interest rates when expectations of a bank run arise.  Its advantage over domestic-
currency denominated deposits is that the inflation/devaluation component of the interest rate is 
only paid if inflation/devaluation occurs.  Thus, banks’ fundamentals are less likely to be 
undermined.  This helps to explain, incidentally, why deposit indexation is so popular in EMs.  
However, indexation increases the burden on the LOLR because deposits are now denominated 
in real terms.  In fact, if all deposits are indexed to the exchange rate, for example,  there would 
not be a major difference between this case and full dollarization. 
Why do advanced countries, like the US, manage to have an effective LOLR?  The 
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answer suggested above is simple: advanced countries never lose access to capital markets. xlvi  
Was it critical for those countries to be able to print their own currencies?  We doubt it. 
In terms of the exchange-rate volatility issue, this discussion shows that, contrary to 
popular belief, fixing the exchange rate may not entail a substantial loss of LOLR capabilities in 
countries that are credit-constrained.  Moreover, a limited LOLR gives rise to indexation of 
deposits.  Aside from Chile, where the UDIs have been a very successful indexation to a 
domestic price level, and Brazil for a limited period of time, all other cases involve indexation to 
a hard currency (typically the US dollar).  This, in turn, induces banks (sometimes due regulatory 
reasons) to extend dollar loans.  Given that domestic banks have a comparative advantage in 
lending to domestic residents, those loans will likely be channeled to them (and not recycled to 
the rest of the world). xlvii  However, not all domestic residents’ earnings are denominated in 
dollars.  In the services sector, for example, the dominant invoice currency is mostly domestic.  
Therefore, a devaluation may create serious financial problem in some sectors of the economy.  
This is an additional reason for the fear of floating. 
 
4. Liability Dollarization 
It could be argued that liability dollarization is partly a result of pegging, magnified by 
the overconfidence and moral hazard problems that pegging may foster.  As the argument 
usually goes, if the exchange rate was free to float, domestic investors, especially those in the 
nontradable sector, would shy away from foreign-exchange denominated loans.  This is so 
because they will now face a larger currency risk than under fix.  This sounds convincing, but it 
misses two important points: (1) most EMs start from a situation of partial dollarization (at the 
 
 32 
very least, liability dollarization), and (2) it is really very hard to find instances in which an EM 
completely ignores exchange rate volatility.  These points reinforce each other.  Partial 
dollarization increases the cost of exchange rate volatility (through the Fisherian channel, for 
example), inducing the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent 
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate.  In fact, as the cases of El Salvador, the Philippines, 
and Venezuela attest, this “fear of floating” may be so severe that the exchange rate spends long 
stretches of time at a fixed level, making it observationally equivalent to a soft peg. xlviii  This 
fear of floating induces more liability dollarization, creating a vicious circle from which it is very 
hard to exit. xlix   
Fear of floating and lack of the discipline that underlies fixed exchange rates may drive 
authorities to adopt additional control measures, like dual exchange rates and controls on capital 
mobility. Even when fear of floating does not lead to capital controls and countries adopt 
“market-friendly” ways of stabilizing the exchange rate through open market operations, such 
policies have significant costs both in terms of the interest rate volatility associated with them as 
well as their procyclical nature.   Thus, contrary to the view that floating provides authorities 
with an extra degree of freedom to guarantee a market-friendly environment, the opposite may 
happen. 
 
 V.  Concluding Remarks 
Going beyond superficial classifications and taking the wealth of evidence at hand, if the 
past is any guide to the future, promises and statements by countries to move in the direction of a 
floating exchange rate may be devoid of real consequences.  As shown in earlier, there appears to 
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be a widespread “fear of floating” that is closely linked with credibility problems.   
The root causes of the marked reluctance by emerging markets to allow for much 
fluctuation in their exchange rate are multiple.  In this paper we investigate a few. When 
circumstances are favorable (i.e.,there are capital inflows, positive terms-of-trade shocks, etc.), 
many emerging market countries are reluctant to allow the nominal (and real) exchange rate to 
appreciate.l  This probably stems from fears of the “Dutch disease” type problems--loss of 
competitiveness and serious setbacks to export diversification.  When circumstances are adverse, 
the case against allowing large depreciations (or a devaluation if the exchange rate is explicitly 
pegged) becomes even more compelling. The fear of a collapse in the exchange rate comes from 
pervasive liability dollarization, as in most emerging markets the debt of both the government and 
the private sector are largely denominated in hard foreign currency.  As shown here, 
devaluations/depreciations may also result in the loss of access to international capital markets.  
For this and other reasons, devaluations or depreciations in developing countries have a history of 
being associated with recessions--not export-led booms.  Our theoretical framework  illustrates 
this point.  Furthermore, the authorities may resist large swings in the exchange rate because of 
their inflationary consequences and the credibility problems these may feed.  As shown here, even 
in the best of times, exchange rate volatility appears to hinder trade--which is so essential to EMs. 
 We have shown that the pass-through from exchange rates to prices is higher for EMs.  Similarly, 
our review of the literature on the consequences of exchange rate volatility on trade, suggests that 
developing countries’ trade appears to be more systematically 
If  fearing significant exchange rate swings continues to be the serious policy issue it has 
been in the past, and if, as the stylized facts suggest, EMs remain dollarized both in terms of their 
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debt and the invoicing of trade and if their prices continue to be more predominantly linked to the 
fate of the exchange rate, it would appear that there is little solid grounds on which to expect that 
EMs will “simply float.” Indeed, as the dust settles following the Asian crisis and capital flows 
aggresively return to that region, we are seeing many of the old ways resurface--foreign exchange 
intervention rules the day and currency appreciations are actively resisted.  Alas, it sounds a great 
deal like the early 1990s.  Other countries, like Brazil and Mexico, have embraced “inflation 
targeting.” But in countries where the pass-through from exchange rates to prices is high, 
inflation targeting often starts to resemble a soft peg, as swings in the exchange rate are resisted.   
In summary, much of the glitter of “flexible” exchange rates disappears upon closer 
examination.  The extra degrees of freedom provided by exchange rate flexibility are fallacious or 
can be substituted by fiscal policy.  In reality, it appears that in EMs what prevails are varieties of 
soft pegs--despite their poor track record.  Which raises the issue of why bother having a national 
currency in the first place--specifically, dollarization. 
A point to remember in the debate over whether dollarization is appropriate for emerging 
markets is that these economies are still “emerging.”   They are setting policy in a world in which 
their own financial markets remain underdeveloped, their trade is invoiced predominantly in 
dollars, their corporate and financial institutions have a limited ability to hedge exchange rate 
risk, and their governments, more often than not, lack credibility.  Exchange rate movements are 
costly in this environment.  If policymakers take a hard look at the options for exchange rate 
regimes in emerging economies, they may find that floating regimes may be more of an illusion 
and that fixed rates--particularly, full dollarization--might emerge as a sensible choice for some 
countries, especially in Latin America or in the transition economies in the periphery of Euroland. 
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 Table 1. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes  
 
 
Probability that the monthly percent change 
in nominal exchange rate falls within: 
 
Country 
 
Period 
 
+/- 1 percent band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent band 
 
United States 
$/DM 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
 
26.8 
 
 
58.7 
 
Japan 
 
February 1973-April 1999 
 
33.8 
 
61.2 
 
Australia 
 
January 1984-April 1999 
 
28 
 
70.3 
 
Bolivia 
 
September 1985-December 1997 
 
72.8 
 
93.9 
 
Canada 
 
June 1970-April 1999 
 
68.2 
 
93.6 
 
India 
 
March 1993-April 1999 
 
82.2 
 
93.4 
 
Kenya 
 
October 1993-December 1997 
 
50 
 
72.2 
 
Mexico 
 
December 1994-April 1999 
 
34.6 
 
63.5 
 
New Zealand 
 
March 1985-April 1999 
 
39.1 
 
72.2 
 
Nigeria 
 
October 1986-March 1993 
 
36.4 
 
74.5 
 
Norway 
 
December 1992-December 1994 
 
79.2 
 
95.8 
 
Peru 
 
August 1990-April 1999 
 
45.2 
 
71.4 
 
Philippines 
 
January 1988-April 1999 
 
60.7 
 
74.9 
 
South Africa 
 
January 1983-April 1999 
 
32.8 
 
66.2 
 
Spain 
 
January 1984-May 1989 
 
57.8 
 
93.8 
 
Sweden 
 
November 1992-April 1999 
 
35.1 
 
75.5 
 
Uganda 
 
January 1992-April 1999 
 
52.9 
 
77.9 
 
Average, excluding U.S. and Japan 
 
51.67 
 
79.27 
 
Standard deviation, excluding U.S. and Japan 
 
17.83 
 
11.41 
Source: Based on Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
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Table 2. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current  
“Managed Floating” Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
Probability that the monthly percent change 
in nominal exchange rate falls within: 
 
Country 
 
Period 
 
+/- 1 percent band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent band 
 
 
Bolivia 
 
January 1998-April 1999 
 
100 
 
100 
 
Brazil 
 
July 1994-December 1998 
 
83.1 
 
94.3 
 
Chile 
 
October 1982-April 1999 
 
45.5 
 
83.8 
 
Colombia 
 
January 1979-April 1999 
 
15.6 
 
86.8 
 
Egypt 
 
February 1991-December 1998 
 
95.7 
 
98.9 
 
Greece 
 
January 1977-December 1997 
 
58.6 
 
85.3 
 
India 
 
February 1979-February 1993 
 
53.6 
 
84.5 
 
Indonesia 
 
November 1978-June 1997 
 
96.4 
 
99.1 
 
Israel 
 
December 1991-April 1999 
 
45.5 
 
90.9 
 
Kenya 
 
January 1998-April 1999 
 
51 
 
70.6 
 
Korea 
 
March 1980-October 1997 
 
80.1 
 
97.6 
 
Malaysia 
 
December 1992-September 1998 
 
59.4 
 
81.2 
 
Mexico 
 
January 1989-November 1994 
 
64.3 
 
95.7 
 
Norway 
 
January 1995-April 1999 
 
56.9 
 
90.2 
 
Pakistan 
 
January 1982-April 1999 
 
77.8 
 
92.8 
 
Singapore 
 
January 1988-April 1999 
 
61.5 
 
88.9 
 
Turkey 
 
January 1980-April 1999 
 
12.6 
 
36.8 
 
Uruguay 
 
January 1993-April 1999 
 
22.7 
 
92 
 
Venezuela 
 
April 1996-April 1999 
 
60.6 
 
93.9 
 
Average 
 
60.05 
 
87.54 
 
Standard deviation 
 
25.43 
 
14.28 
Source: Based on Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
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Table 3. Exchange Rate Volatility in Recent or Current “Limited Flexibility”  
Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
Probability that the monthly percent change in 
nominal exchange rate falls within: 
 
Country 
 
Period 
 
+/- 1 percent band  
 
+/- 2.5 percent band 
 
 
France 
 
March 1979-April 1999 
 
86.7 
 
97.5 
 
Greece 
 
January 1998-April 1999 
 
40 
 
80 
 
Malaysia 
 
January 1986-February 1990 
 
71.4 
 
98.1 
 
Spain 
 
June 1989-April 1999 
 
67 
 
92.4 
 
Sweden 
 
June 1985-October 1992 
 
58.1 
 
92.1 
 
Average 
 
64.64 
 
92.02 
 
Standard deviation 
 
17.23 
 
7.27
Source: Based on Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
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Table 4. Current Account Adjustments and GDP Growth  
Before and After Currency Crises 
 
 
Country group 
 
T-1 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
T, 
currency 
crisis 
year 
(2) 
 
T+1 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Change 
from  
T-1 to T+1 
 
(4) 
 
Change/ 
Pre-crisis 
(4)/(1) 
 
(5) 
 
Current account deficit as a percent of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Emerging markets 
 
-4.86 
 
-3.97 
 
-1.39 
 
3.47 
 
-77.8 
 
Developed countries 
 
-2.84 
 
-3.06 
 
-2.10 
 
0.74 
 
-26.1 
 
Difference 
 
-1.62 
 
-0.91 
 
0.71  
 
2.73** 
 
 
 
Percent change in real GDP 
 
 
 
 
Emerging markets 
 
3.61 
 
1.27 
 
1.62 
 
-1.99 
 
-55.0 
 
Developed countries 
 
1.73 
 
1.49 
 
1.58 
 
-0.15 
 
-8.7 
 
Difference 
 
1.88** 
 
-0.22 
 
0.04 
 
-1.84** 
 
 
Sources: The World Bank and the authors. 
Notes:  A total of ninety-six currency crises, of which twenty-five are in developed economies 
and the remainder are in emerging markets.  Two asterisks (**) denote significance at the five 
percent level. 
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 Table 5. Scale for Moody's Foreign Currency Debt Rating 
 
Rating Scale 
 
 
Assigned Value 
 
 Aaa 
 
16  
Aa1 
 
15  
Aa2 
 
14  
Aa3 
 
13  
A1 
 
12  
A2 
 
11  
A3 
 
10  
Baa1 
 
9  
Baa2 
 
8  
Baa3 
 
7  
Ba1 
 
6  
Ba2 
 
5  
Ba3 
 
4  
B1 
 
3  
B2 
 
2  
B3 
 
1  
C 
 
0 
Sources: Moody’s and the authors. 
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Table 6.  The Probability and Magnitude of Downgrades Around Currency Crises: 
Institutional Investor Sovereign Credit Ratings, 1979-1999 
 
 
 
 
Probability of 
(in percent) 
 
Country 
Group 
 
a downgrade in six 
months following 
the crisis 
 
a downgrade in 
twelve months 
following the crisis
 
more than one downgrade 
in the twelve months 
following the crisis
 
Emerging 
 
39.0
 
79.3
 
31.7
 
Developed 
 
38.4
 
73.1
 
30.8
 
Difference 
 
0.6
 
6.2
 
0.9
 
 
 
Index level 
 
 
 
 
At crisis period
 
Next six months
 
12 months later
 
Emerging 
 
37.6
 
36.0
 
33.5
 
Developed 
 
76.0
 
74.9
 
74.5
 
Difference 
 
-38.4**
 
-38.9**
 
-41.0**
 
 
 
Magnitude of the downgrade in 
(percent change) 
 
 
 
six months 
following the crisis 
 
the next six months
 
the twelve months 
following the crisis
 
Emerging 
 
4.3
 
6.9
 
10.9
 
Developed 
 
1.4
 
0.5
 
1.9
 
Difference 
 
2.8*
 
6.4**
 
8.9**
Notes: One asterisk (*) denotes significance at the ten percent level, while two asterisks (**) 
denote significance at the five percent level. 
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Table 7.  The Probability and Magnitude of Downgrades Around Currency Crises: 
Moody’s Sovereign Credit Ratings, 1979-1999 
 
 
 
 
 Probability of 
 (in percent) 
 
Country 
Group 
 
a downgrade in six 
months following 
the crisis  
 
a downgrade in 
twelve months 
following the crisis 
 
more than one downgrade 
in the twelve months 
following the crisis 
 
Emerging 
 
20.0 
 
26.7 
 
6.7 
 
Developed 
 
10.0 
 
10.0 
 
0.0 
 
Difference 
 
10.0** 
 
16.7** 
 
6.7* 
 
 
 
Index level 
 
 
Emerging 
 
4.9 
 
4.5 
 
4.3 
 
Developed 
 
15.0 
 
14.9 
 
14.9 
 
Difference 
 
-10.1** 
 
-10.4** 
 
-10.6** 
 
 
 
Magnitude of the downgrade in 
 (percent change) 
 
 
 
six months 
following the crisis  
 
the next six months 
 
the twelve months 
following the crisis 
 
Emerging 
 
8.2 
 
4.4 
 
12.2 
 
Developed 
 
0.7 
 
0.0 
 
0.7 
 
Difference 
 
7.5** 
 
4.4** 
 
11.5** 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes difference is significant at the ten percent level, while two asterisks 
denote significant differences at the five percent level. 
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 Table 8. Reactive Credit Ratings:  Developed and Emerging Markets 
  
 
Dependent variable: Institutional 
Investor six-month changes in sovereign 
rating  
 
Estimation method: 
OLS with robust standard errors 
 
Independent variable 
is a currency crisis 
dummy 
 
Coefficient
(1)
 
Standard 
error
(2)
 
Probability 
value 
(3) 
 
 R2 
(4)
 
Developed 
 
-0.009
 
0.019
 
0.61 
 
0.01
 
Emerging 
 
-0.04**
 
0.014
 
0.005 
 
0.07
 
Dependent variable: Moody’s three-
month changes in sovereign rating  
 
Estimation method: 
Ordered probit 
 
Independent variable 
is a currency crisis 
dummy 
 
Coefficient
(1)
 
Standard 
error
(2)
 
Probability 
 
(3) 
 
Pseudo R2
(4)
 
Developed 
 
-0.08
 
0.90
 
0.901 
 
0.001
 
Emerging 
 
-0.27**
 
0.14
 
0.048 
 
0.04
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes difference is significant at the ten percent level, while two asterisks 
denote significant differences at the five percent level.  
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Table 9. A Summary of the Empirical Literature on the Effects of  
Exchange Rate Variability on Trade with an Emphasis on Emerging Markets 
 
 
Study 
 
Period and 
country coverage 
 
Volatility/risk 
measure 
 
Estimation method 
and approach 
 
Key findings 
 
Mixed sample of emerging and developed economies 
 
Brada and Mendez 
(1988) 
 
30 countries of 
which 14 are EMs, 
1973-1977 
 
Dummy variable 
was assigned to 
designate whether a 
country has a fixed 
or flexible exchange 
rate. 
 
Cross section 
 
Mixed results, for 
EMs exchange rate 
uncertainty 
inhibits bilateral 
exports. 
 
Frankel and Wei 
(1993) 
 
63 countries, annual 
data for 1980, 1985, 
1990. 
 
Standard deviation 
of the first 
difference of log of 
nominal and real 
exchange rate 
 
Gravity model of 
bilateral trade. 
Cross section OLS 
and instrumental 
variables 
 
Mixed results. 
Small negative 
significant effect in 
1980; positive 
significant  effect in 
1990. 
 
Savides (1992) 
 
62 developed and 
emerging 
economies, 1973-
1986 
 
Attempts to 
separate expected 
and unexpected 
variability of the 
real exchange rate 
 
Two step procedure 
for cross-sectional 
export s. 
 
Only the 
unexpected 
variability measure 
has a negative and 
significant effect on 
export volumes, this 
result is robust 
when the countries 
are disaggregated 
into developed and 
EM groups. 
 
Emerging economies only 
 
Arize, Osang, and 
Slottje (2000) 
 
13 EMs, Quarterly 
data, 1973-1996 
Ecuador, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Morocco, 
Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and 
Tunisia 
 
Moving standard 
deviation of real 
effective exchange 
rate volatility. 
 
Johansen’s 
cointegrating 
VARs. 
Country-specific 
error correction 
models are 
estimated for 
exports. 
 
Increases in the 
volatility of the real 
effective exchange 
rate, exert a 
significant 
negative effect on 
exports in both the 
short and long run 
in all 13 countries. 
 
Caballero and 
Corbo (1989) 
 
6 EMs, 
Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Philippines, 
Thailand and 
Turkey 
 
Real bilateral 
exchange rate 
variance 
 
Koych-type model 
is used to estimate 
export demand 
equations. 
 
Strong, negative 
and significant 
effect of real 
exchange rate 
uncertainty on the 
exports of all the 
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countries in the 
sample. 
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Table 9. A Summary of the Empirical Literature on the Effects of  
Exchange Rate Variability on Trade with an Emphasis on Emerging Markets 
(concluded) 
 
 
Study 
 
Period and 
country coverage 
 
Volatility/risk 
measure 
 
Estimation method 
and approach 
 
Key findings 
 
Emerging economies only 
 
Coes (1981) 
 
Brazil, 1965-1974, 
annual data 
 
real exchangerate 
variability and also 
dummy for 
crawling peg period 
 
log- linear demand 
for Brazilian 
exports 
 
The reduction in 
exchange rate 
uncertainty during 
the crawling peg 
period significantly 
increased exports. 
 
Grobar (1993) 
 
10 EMs, 1963-
1985, Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, 
Greece, Malaysia, 
Mexico, 
Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, 
and Yugoslavia 
 
Four uncertainty 
indices capturing 
diffrent measure of 
real exchange rate 
volatility. 
 
Export supply by 
SITC category . 
Pooled time-series, 
cross-sectional data, 
fixed effects. 
 
Most of the export 
categories were 
adversely affected 
by exchange rate 
uncertainty. 
 
Medhora (1990) 
 
West African 
Monetary Union 
 
Real exchange 
effectiverate 
variance. 
 
Import demand 
equations 
 
Found no evidence 
that exchange rate 
variability affected 
African imports. 
 
Paredes (1989) 
 
Chile and Peru 
 
Various measures 
 
Manufactured 
exports, log-linear 
specification for 
individual 
countries. 
 
Volatility has a 
significantly 
adverse effect on 
exports. 
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Table 10. A Summary of the Incidence and Magnitude 
of Exchange Rate Passthrough 
 
 
Country group 
 
Proportion of cases where there was a 
statistically significant passthrough  
 
Emerging 
 
0.43 
 
Developed 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
Average passthrough coefficient 
 
Emerging 
 
0.228 
 
Developed 
 
0.065 
 
Difference 
 
0.163** 
Sources: International Financial Stastistics, International Monetary Fund and the authors, based 
Appendix Tables 3-6. 
Notes: Two asterisks denote significance at the five percent level or higher.  Deatils of the 
country and period coverage are provided in Apprendix Tables 3-6. 
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 Table 11.  Credibility Problems and Financial Volatility 
 
 
Country Group 
 
Average Variance in Monthly interest rates
 
Emerging 
 
758.19
 
    Emerging excluding high  
  inflation 
 
80.15
 
Developed 
 
16.78
 
Difference excluding high  
inflation 
 
63.37**
Note: Two asterisks (**) denote difference is significant at the five percent level.  
Sources: International Financial Statistics, various central banks.  Calculations based on Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000) 
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 Appendix Table 1 Country coverage, January 1970-December 1999 
 
 
Africa: 
 
 
 
 
 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Asia: 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
Korea 
 
Malaysia 
 
Philippines 
 
Thailand 
 
 
 
Europe and the Middle East:  
 
 
 
 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Denmark 
 
Egypt 
 
Finland 
 
Greece 
 
Israel 
 
Norway 
 
Spain 
 
Sweden 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America: 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
Bolivia 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Uruguay 
 
Venezuela 
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 Appendix Table 2 Currency crisis dates 
 
 
 
Argentina 
 
 
June 1975 
February 1981* 
July 1982 
September 1986* 
April 1989 
February 1990 
 
Bolivia 
 
November 1982 
November 1983 
September 1985 
 
Brazil 
 
February 1983 
November 1986* 
July 1989 
November 1990 
October 1991 
January 1999 
 
Chile 
 
December 1971 
August 1972 
October 1973 
December 1974 
January 1976 
August 1982* 
September 1984 
 
Colombia 
 
March 1983* 
February 1985* 
August 1998* 
 
Czech Republic 
 
May 1997 
 
Denmark 
 
May 1971 
June 1973 
November 1979 
August 1993 
 
Egypt 
 
January 1979 
August 1989 
June 1990 
 
Finland 
 
June 1973 
October 1982 
November 1991* 
September 1992* 
 
Greece 
 
May 1976 
November 1980 
July 1984 
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 Appendix Table 2 Currency crisis dates (continued) 
 
 
Country 
 
Currency Crisis 
 
Indonesia 
 
November 1978 
April 1983 
September 1986 
August 1997 
 
Israel 
 
November 1974 
November 1977 
October 1983* 
July 1984 
 
Malaysia 
 
July 1975 
August 1997* 
 
Mexico 
 
September 1976 
February 1982* 
December 1982* 
December 1994* 
 
Norway 
 
June 1973 
February 1978 
May 1986* 
December 1992 
 
Peru 
 
June 1976 
October 1987 
 
Philippines 
 
February 1970 
October 1983* 
June 1984 
July 1997* 
 
South Africa 
 
September 1975 
July 1981 
July 1984 
May 1996 
 
South Korea 
 
June 1971 
December 1974 
January 1980 
October 1997 
 
Spain 
 
February 1976 
July 1977* 
December 1982 
February 1986 
September 1992 
May 1993 
 
Sweden 
 
August 1977 
September 1981 
October 1982 
November 1992* 
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 Appendix Table 2 Currency crisis dates (concluded) 
 
 
Country 
 
Currency Crisis 
 
Thailand 
 
November 1978* 
July 1981 
November 1984 
July 1997* 
 
Turkey 
 
August 1970 
January 1980 
March 1994* 
 
Uruguay 
 
December 1971* 
October 1982* 
 
Venezuela 
 
February 1984 
December 1986 
March 1989 
May 1994* 
December 1995 
* Twin crises episode. 
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Appendix Table 3. Significance Levels for Block Exogeneity Tests:  
Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes 
Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
 
 
Exchange rate equation, ε 
 
Inflation equation, πt  
 
 
 
 
ε 
 
πt   
 
ε 
 
 πt  
 
United States/Yen 
 
0.703 
 
0.574 
 
 0.906 
 
0.000 
 
Japan 
 
0.294 
 
0.889 
 
0.313 
 
0.000 
 
Australia 
 
0.389 
 
0.158 
 
0.045 
 
0.000 
 
Bolivia 
 
0.000 
 
0.459 
 
0.000 
 
0.015 
 
Canada 
 
0.024 
 
0.065 
 
0.246 
 
0.000 
 
India 
 
0.151 
 
0.342 
 
0.723 
 
0.000 
 
Indonesia 
 
0.786 
 
0.743 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Mexico 
 
0.880 
 
0.967 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
New Zealand 
 
0.048 
 
0.009 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
Nigeria 
 
0.475 
 
0.797 
 
0.741 
 
0.003 
 
Norway 
 
0.027 
 
0.319 
 
0.153 
 
0.297 
 
Peru 
 
0.004 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Philippines 
 
0.237 
 
0.829 
 
0.267 
 
0.000 
 
South Africa 
 
0.013 
 
0.004 
 
0.059 
 
0.000 
 
South Korea 
 
0.329 
 
0.268 
 
0.000 
 
0.795 
 
Spain 
 
0.219 
 
0.788 
 
0.792 
 
0.916 
 
Sweden 
 
0.167 
 
0.490 
 
0.592 
 
0.703 
 
Thailand 
 
0.335 
 
0.924 
 
0.668 
 
0.281 
 
Uganda 
 
0.539 
 
0.046 
 
0.022 
 
0.000 
 
Venezuela 
 
0.861 
 
0.956 
 
0.560 
 
0.000 
 
Note: Entries in bold indicate significance at the ten percent level or higher. 
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Appendix Table 4. Significance Levels for Block Exogeneity Tests:  
Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes 
Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
 
 
Exchange rate equation, ε 
 
Inflation equation, πt  
 
 
 
 
ε 
 
πt   
 
ε 
 
 πt  
 
Bolivia 
 
0.487 
 
0.814 
 
0.091 
 
0.942 
 
Brazil 
 
0.275 
 
0.297 
 
0.279 
 
0.000 
 
Chile 
 
0.918 
 
0.000 
 
0.849 
 
0.000 
 
Colombia 
 
0.000 
 
0.240 
 
0.739 
 
0.000 
 
Egypt 
 
0.025 
 
0.004 
 
0.575 
 
0.303 
 
Greece 
 
0.673 
 
0.343 
 
0.214 
 
0.000 
 
India 
 
0.398 
 
0.081 
 
0.557 
 
0.000 
 
Indonesia 
 
0.999 
 
0.100 
 
0.403 
 
0.000 
 
Israel 
 
0.833 
 
0.269 
 
0.315 
 
0.000 
 
Kenya 
 
0.706 
 
0.904 
 
0.764 
 
0.962 
 
Malaysia 
 
0.524 
 
0.269 
 
0.050 
 
0.141 
 
Mexico 
 
0.358 
 
0.419 
 
0.702 
 
0.000 
 
Norway 
 
0.746 
 
0.426 
 
0.526 
 
0.951 
 
Pakistan 
 
0.907 
 
0.278 
 
0.905 
 
0.002 
 
Singapore 
 
0.084 
 
0.045 
 
0.138 
 
0.040 
 
South Korea 
 
0.000 
 
0.851 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Turkey 
 
0.135 
 
0.298 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Uruguay 
 
0.691 
 
0.010 
 
0.021 
 
0.000 
 
Venezuela 
 
0.264 
 
0.055 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
Note: Entries in bold indicate significance at the ten percent level or higher. 
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Appendix Table 5. Significance Levels for Block Exogeneity Tests:  
Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes 
Limited Flexibility Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 
 
 
Exchange rate equation, ε 
 
Inflation equation, πt  
 
 
 
 
ε 
 
πt   
 
ε 
 
 πt  
 
France 
 
0.042 
 
0.605 
 
0.297 
 
0.000 
 
Germany 
 
0.587 
 
0.275 
 
0.390 
 
0.000 
 
Greece 
 
0.724 
 
0.476 
 
0.111 
 
0.827 
 
Malaysia 
 
0.899 
 
0.085 
 
0.123 
 
0.688 
 
Spain 
 
0.036 
 
0.139 
 
0.173 
 
0.000 
 
Sweden 
 
0.589 
 
0.708 
 
0.521 
 
0.509 
 
Note: Entries in bold indicate significance at the ten percent level or higher. 
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Appendix Table 6. Exchange Rate Pass-through Coefficients 
 
 
Country 
 
Exchange Rate Arrangement and Dates 
 
Coefficient of ε in inflation 
equation 
 
 Emerging Markets 
 
Bolivia  
 
Float, September 1985-December 1997 
 
0.474 
 
Bolivia 
 
Managed floating, January 1998,-November 
1999 
 
1.001 
 
Indonesia  
 
Float, August 1997-November, 1999 
 
0.062 
 
Malaysia  
 
Managed floating, December 1992-August 
1998 
 
0.02 
 
Mexico 
 
Float, January 1995-November 1999 
 
0.076 
 
Peru 
 
Float, August 1990-November 1999 
 
0.149 
 
South Africa 
 
Float, January 1989-November 1999 
 
0.098 
 
South Korea 
 
Managed floating, March 1980-November 
1997 
 
0.014 
 
South Korea  
 
Float, December 1997-November 1999 
 
0.085 
 
Turkey 
 
Managed floating, January 1980-November 
1999 
 
0.256 
 
Uganda 
 
Floating, January 1992-November 1999 
 
0.147 
 
Uruguay 
 
Managed floating, January 1993-November 
1999 
 
0.468 
 
Venezuela 
 
Managed floating, April 1996-November, 
1999 
 
0.114 
 
Average 
 
0.228 
 
Standard deviation 
 
0.276 
 
 Developed Economies 
 
Australia 
 
Float, January 1984-November 1999 
 
0.059 
 
New Zealand 
 
March 1985-November 1999 
 
0.071 
 
Average 
 
0.065 
 
Standard deviation 
 
0.008 
Note: This table only reports coefficients for those cases where the estimated pass-through was 
statistically significant at the ten percent level (or higher). 
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 Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i. At the time of the crisis, Korea and Malaysia were self-classified as managed floats, Indonesia 
had an exchange rate band and the Philippines de jure label was freely floating.    
ii. See also Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999), for a discussion of these issues. 
iii.  “Fear of floating” refers to the fact that countries with exchange rate regimes that are 
classified as flexible, more often than not, maintain their exchange rates within a narrow band 
with respect to some anchor currency--usually the United States dollar.  More broadly, however, 
EMs display a chronic fear of a large swing in their currencies, as also evidenced by the 
lengths countries go to avoid a devaluation, when their exchange rates are pegged. 
iv. Their data is monthly and covers thirty- nine countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the 
Western Hemisphere during the January 1970-April 1999 period.  The countries are Argentina, 
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela. One- 
hundred-and-fifty-four exchange rate arrangements are covered in their sample.   
v. The exchange rate is end-of-period. 
vi. Calvo and Reinhart (2000) also analyze international reserves, nominal and real interest rates, 
base money (nominal and real), prices, and a broad array of commodity prices that are relevant 
for a particular country. 
vii. For instance following the ERM crisis many European countries adopted (at least, in 
principle) +/- 15 percent bands for the exchange rate.  Similarly, until recently Chile had 
comparably wide bands.  Other examples include Mexico prior to December 1994--which had an 
“ever-widening” band, as the lower end (appreciation) of the band was fixed and the upper ceiling 
(depreciation) was crawling--Israel, and Colombia during 1994-1998. 
viii. The t-statistic for the difference in means test is 3.38, with a probability value of (0.00) under 
the null hypothesis of no difference. 
ix. The variance of the monthly changes Mexican peso/US $ is about twice as large as the 
variance of the monthly changes in the ¥/US $ exchange rate. 
x. For the FF-PE means test the probability value is (0.00); for the FF-MF it is (0.04); for the MF-
LF means test the probability value is (0.32); and for the LF-PE it is (0.44). 
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xi. See Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
xii. All of these crises ended with a devaluation. 
xiii. The dates of these currency crises are listed in Appendix Table 2. 
xiv. We define a currency crises,as in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who construct an index of 
exchange market pressure.  This captures reserve losses and depreciation; it is a weighted average 
of these two indicators with weights such that the two components have equal sample volatility.  
Because changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive weight and reserves enter with a 
negative weight, large positive readings of this index indicate speculative attacks.  Readings of 
this index that are three standard deviations above its mean are classified as crises.   
xv. Although for the developed countries, the pre- and post-devaluation difference in growth is 
not significantly different from zero. 
xvi. The textbook story emphasizes the influence of a change in relative prices in shifting the 
composition of a given level of aggregate demand.  Both the Keynesian and Fisherian channels 
provide mechanisms why total demand might fall. 
xvii. Recall CA + KA +  ΔR, ≡0, where CA denotes the current account balance, KA is capital 
account balance and changes in reserves are denoted by ΔR, where a negative number indicates 
an accumulation of reserves by the monetary authority. 
xviii. For the contractionary consequences of devaluations in developing countries, see also 
Edwards (1986) and (1989) and Morley (1992).  In both of these studies focus on devaluation 
episodes, even when it was not associated with a crisis. 
xix. See Calvo and Reinhart (1999).  
xx. An unbalanced panel, in this case, refers to the fact that we do not have the same number of 
observations for all the countries. 
xxi. This approach follows the procedure adopted in Cantor and Packer (1996a and 1996b). 
xxii. We want to examine whether the rating changes follow immediately after the crises, but as 
the index is only published twice a year, this ability to discriminate is not possible. 
xxiii. See Larraín, Reisen, and von Maltzan (1997). 
xxiv. See Côté (1994) for a comprehensive survey of this literature. 
xxv. See McKinnon  (1979). 
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xxvi.  McKinnon (1999). 
 
xxvii.  See Quian and Varangis (1994). 
xxviii. See Reinhart and Wickham, (1996). 
xxix. See, for example, Mishkin and Savastano (1999). 
xxx. For an alternative approach to this issue, see Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (1999). 
xxxi. See Calvo, Reinhart, and Végh (1996), on this issue. 
xxxii. These results are based on Appendix Tables 3-6. 
xxxiii. Of course, while a high passthrough is undesirable from the vantage point of controlling 
inflation, it helps cushion the effects of a devaluation (or depreciation) when there is extensive 
liability dollarization--an issue we will return to in the next section. 
xxxiv.   The results are based on the episodes shown in Tables 1-3.  For country-specific details 
see Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
xxxv. Calvo (1999). 
xxxvi. This section draws heavily from Calvo and Reinhart (2000). 
xxxvii.   Moreover, as shown in Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Calvo (1983), interest-rate 
targeting may leave the system without a nominal anchor, even in the case where credibility is not 
an issue. 
xxxviii.  For further evidence about the sizable credit cut in EMs during recent crises, see Calvo 
and Reinhart, 1999. 
xxxix. Thus, the economy exhibits all the characteristics of the model in Calvo and Vegh (1993), 
which permits us to skip the technical discussion. 
xl.  Over time e will return to its initial steady state and, hence, initial expansion will vanish.  
However, this analysis will not be pursued here because we just wish to focus on impact effects. 
xli. What happens as a result of currency appreciations?  A mechanical extension of the above 
model shows that credit-constrained economies would suffer a smaller contraction.  However, this 
extension is misleading because it implies that credit-constrained economies cannot lend abroad.  
If, instead, we assume that there are no constraints to lending, then one would get the same 
contractionary effects from currency appreciation in constrained and unconstrained economies.  
An insight of this analysis is that in credit-constrained economies any exchange rate fluctuation is 
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contractionary.  Exchange rate volatility is harmful. 
xlii. See Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
 
xliii.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
xliv. DD is a two-period model and, thus, the issue of how to finance the bank bailout does not 
arise.  Moreover, that paper does not discuss the critical issue of whether government is capable 
of raising the necessary additional taxes. 
xlv.   But this should be ruled out in this example because, otherwise, the country would not be 
credit constrained.  
xlvi. This may change for Japan if forecasters are right and in a few months domestic public debt 
reaches 130 percent of GDP! 
xlvii. After the 1998 Russian crisis, however, banks in Latin America have exhibited a much 
lessened appetite in lending to the domestic private sector. 
xlviii. This was also the case for Mexico prior to the Colosio assassination, despite an announces 
ever-widening band.  
xlix.  Fear of floating may also arise whenever domestic firms utilize foreign raw materials.  In 
this case, floating is less destructive than in the previous example but it can still cause financial 
difficulties in the medium term. 
l.  In the context of fixed exchange rates, revaluations are, indeed, rare. 
